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The Global Innovation Divide
Jeffrey Sachs, The Earth Institute at Columbia University, and NBER
Executive Summary
Until very recently, science was not considered a core part of development
strategy, especially in the case of the poorest countries. While this misconcep-
tion is changing, as it changes, it is becoming clear that there is not enough of
the critically needed science base to solve a lot of the development problems
in the poorest countries. This chapter highlights the causes of this divide as
well as steps that can be taken to promote a technological upgrading in low-
income countries, whether by the diffusion of technologies from abroad, or by
the development of innovative technologies at home.
I. Introduction
My subject here is the nature of innovation systems in poor countries
or, more particularly, the lack of such systems, and why innovation
and technological advance do not take place at a vigorous rate in large
parts of the developing world. I'm going to identify some hypotheses
and research issues to be pursued, very much hoping that the research
group at the NBER can take on some of the challenges. I think that the
challenges of economic development are not going to be addressed
properly until we better integrate issues of science and technology into
the basic economic development strategies of low-income countries.
Until very recently, science was not considered a core part of devel-
opment strategy, especially in the case of the poorest countries. Science
and technology policy is hardly mentioned in the "Washington Consen-
sus" approach to market reforms of the past generation championed by
the Bretton Woods institutions. The World Bank went for many years
without a science advisor, and for even longer without much work on
science and technology policy. In general, science has been considered
to be something for rich countries, while poor countries were supposed
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to focus on good governance, market reforms, and so forth. I think that
this idea is changing very fast. But as it changes, we're discovering that
there isn't enough of the critically needed science base to solve a lot of
the development problems in the poorest countries. We have to think
through why that is. Is the problem simply one of markets not working
well enough, e.g. the lack of intellectual property rights protection or
venture capital financing, or are their other key barriers?
II. Global Divisions in Innovation and Technological Advance
The right starting point for research is the incredible divide in the
world between the technology innovators and the noninnovators, a
division which is considerably starker than the global divisions of in-
come. If you look at almost any indicator of commercialized technolog-
ical innovationand, of course, the patents are the easiest ones to look
atthe gaps between rich and poor are startling, even compared to
the gaps in income. For example, if we consider the country of origin
of U.S. utility patents (determined by the country of origin of the lead
inventor on each utility patent), the top ten innovating countries ac-
count for around 94% of all of the patents taken out in the u.s. in the
year 2000, yet these countries have a combined population of only
around 14% of the world's population. It's roughly a 96-fold higher
ratio of patents per capita in the top ten countries than in the rest of
the world (94/14 divided by 6/86).
If we look at the bottom 128 countries (with population of at least 1
million) on the list ranked by total patents, each of those countries has
fewer than 150 patents. Those countries have 63% of the world's popu-
lation, but only 1174 patents in the year 2000, or just 0.75% of all the
patents taken out in the U.S. that year. There are several dozen coun-
tries with zero patents associated with them. Excluding South Africa,
sub-Saharan Africa has had 1 to 3 patents in total in recent years, for
roughly 600 million people. South Africa has had a few dozen patents
per year; in the year 2000, Nigeria had 2, Kenya 1, and the rest none. So
here is an entire continent with essentially no commercialized activity
taking place in the U.S. If you look at other international patent data,
at the WIPO data or the European Union, you'll find the same phenom-
enon. The issue is not specific to patents taken out in the U.S.
Many people, including myself, have made a rough three-way differ-
entiation of the world for analytical purposes. First, there are roughly
1 billion people in countries enjoying endogenous growth, in which
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innovative activity takes place on a significant scale, and patented
products and technologies are produced and sold domestically and on
world markets. Thus, about one-sixth of the world's population live in
countries that can fairly be described by the models of endogenous
growth. The countries are sometimes termed the "core" economies, in
the long-standing tradition of core-periphery models.
The second major group of countries are the technological diffusers,
which, within a span of five to twenty years, absorb new technologies
developed in the endogenous growth countries. Diffusion typically oc-
curs in at least three ways. First, local firms buy high-tech capital goods
to operate with increasingly advanced production processes, and typi-
cally to produce an increasingly sophisticated range of goods. Second,
these countries are hosts for foreign direct investment (FDI) in manu-
factures and high-tech services (as opposed to commodity extraction).
Third, the consumers adopt these technologies as consumer goods,
such as cell phones and personal computers for home use. Still, these
countries don't display innovation themselves other than in some lim-
ited areas of retrofitting internationally imported technologies for spe-
cific local use. Not much novel technology is produced. I'd estimate
the diffusers at roughly three and a half billion people, a little more than
half of the world. This group includes much of China (particularly in
the eastern and central provinces), a large and increasing part of India
(particularly in the western and southern states), a large part of Latin
America (especially Mexico, Costa Rica, and the Southern Cone of
South America), some parts of eastern Europe (especially the countries
that border on the European Union), and at least some of the former
Soviet Union.
That leaves about one and a half billion people who are marginalized
in the world economy in many ways, but strikingly in the areas of
technological advance. These excluded zones include much of the An-
dean region in South America, almost all of sub-Saharan Africa, and
large parts of Central and South Asia. Of course these countries (or
regions within large countries) are not fully excluded. You'll find cell
phones almost anywhere in the world right now, and similarly Internet
cafes in the capital cities. Technologies do eventually diffuse almost
everywhere. Still, the level of penetration of new technologies (e.g. cell
phones and computers per capita), the rate of diffusion, and the extent
of use of new technologies in domestic production are all extraordi-
narily low. Total FDI in developing countries has soared, but it is highly
concentrated in 10 to 15 countries among the diffusers. The excluded
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countries receive very little FDI other than in the minerals and natural
resources sectors. While commodity-based FDI brings some technol-
ogy, it tends to be in enclave sectors such as oil drilling and diamond
mining, with little spillover of learning or technological innovation into
the rest of the economy.
III. Public and Private Sectors in the Technological Divide
To better understand the gaps in science and technology, we should
also distinguish between two important end users. Part of science and
technology, usually the focus of models of endogenous growth, ends
up as commercialized technologies used within the private sector.
Technological advances of this kind are embodied in goods and ser-
vices produced by private firms and purchased ultimately by private
consumers and businesses. Another major part of science and technol-
ogy, however, does not show up mainly in the private sector, but rather
in the provision of public goods. For example, advances in meteorol-
ogy, climate forecasting, atmospheric chemistry, environmental man-
agement, infectious disease control, geology (e.g. plate tectonics), and
innumerable other areas, are inputs into the direct provision of public
goods such as longterm climate forecasting, earthquake monitoring and
detection, air quality management by public agencies, public health sur-
veillance, fisheries management, environmental protection, and the ]ike.
In these cases, the end users are exclusively, or heavily, governmental
agencies and other nonmarket organizations.
We can think usefully about two kinds of inputs into technological
innovation and two kinds of outputs. On the input sideby which I
mean the creation of new innovations and technologiesthere are both
private and nonprivate actors. Innovators include private businesses,
government laboratories, and not-for-profit academic institutions. In-
creasingly, innovations emerge from the complex interplay of all three
sectors. On the output sideby which I mean the final usersthere
are, as just noted, both private sector users and public sector users of
technological advance. Studies of national innovation systems led by
Richard Nelson of Columbia University and his colleagues have put
great stress on the critical interplay of all of these public and private
institutions on both the input and the output side as critical drivers of
overall technological innovation within an economy.
In the poor countries, it must be understood that the innovation sys-
tems are failing along all dimensions, not just the private provision of
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technologies for private use. The public provision of technologies for
public goods (e.g. national monitoring of the environment for purposes
of public health, food productivity, climate change mitigation and ad-
aptation, risk mitigation from natural disasters, and the like) is almost
nonexistent in dozens of the world's poorest countries. These countries
have governments that are so cash-strapped that they are neither in-
vestors in science and technologies (e.g. by running national labora-
tories) nor end users of science and technology (e.g. by running public
health services to monitor and control epidemic diseases). The absence
of scientific capability in the nongovernmental sectors of the poorest
countries, and the lack of purchasing power by governments in these
countries, are critical elements of the technological stagnation and iso-
lation of the world's poorest countries. The problems and limitations
are not simply in the private marketplace.
This point is especially critical. Even in the very richest and most
market-oriented economies, such as the U.S., the public provision and
use of science and technology is critical to the overall innovation pro-
cess. The U.S. public sector budget for science and technology is over
1% of GNP ($112 billion in budget requests by the Bush Administration
for science and technology in the FY 03 budget). The public sector is
a major direct provider of science and technology (e.g. the National
Institutes of Health, NASA. and the Department of Defense), a major
financier of innovation in the nongovernmental sector (e.g. the Na-
tional Science Foundation), and certainly a major purchaser and end
user of science and technology. Without NIH financing and research
the U.S. pharmaceutical industry would be vastly less productive in
bringing new medicines to market. Indeed the lack of such public institu-
tions in the poorest countries is certainly a critical explanation for the
overall lack of technological innovation in those countries.
IV. Some Basic Sources of the Innovation Divide
I think that there are three deep characteristics of the innovation pro-
cess which help to account for the profound gaps in it between the rich
and the poor, gaps that are even wider than the vast gaps in per capita
income. Yet it is one thing to mention these three characteristics, and
quite another to demonstrate their roles empirically and quantitatively.
That is a central challenge for future research.
First, technological innovation is an increasing-returns-to-scale pro-
cess, both in the production function of new discoveries (in which new
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ideas emerge from the combination and recombination of existing
ideas), and in that the incentive for investment in R&D is itself depen-
dent on the scope of the market, since R&D represents a kind of fixed
cost that must be covered by sufficient unit sales of a new product or
process. Because of the economies of agglomeration in the production
of ideas, scientists tend to congregatein universities, in science parks,
and in regions such as Silicon Valley. This makes it extremely difficult
for small, impoverished countries to hold on to their own scientists,
who naturally migrate to the world's centers of science and technology.
Brain drain is pervasive, and has probably accelerated in the past de-
cade with the intensification of globalization.
Second, as I've already mentioned, science and technology is partly
a market-driven phenomenon. Innovation also depends importantly
on government inputs and government uses of science and technology.
The poorest countries are hindered not only because their markets are
smalland therefore generate little demand for innovation and little
hold on their national scientists who may prefer to move elsewhere
but also because their governments are small and cash-strapped, and
therefore unable to make the public investments also needed for vi-
brant innovation. I would expect to see the research and development
spending by governments as a share of GNP continue to rise signifi-
cantly in the next twenty-five years, with increases of perhaps another
2% of GNP in the high income countries (on top of 1% or more of GNP
spent today by governments in the technological leaders). The returns
to this spending will be extremely high, and much of it will have to
be done by governments rather than the private sector. In very poor
countries, public sector support for science and technology hardly ex-
ists and will have to be created, and donor financing will be critical.
Third, a considerable share of modern technology, in many different
areas, is highly ecology-specific. This means that technologies appro-
priate for one ecological setting, say the temperate zones of the U.S.,
may have little direct relevance in another ecological setting, say a trop-
ical rain forest. The diffusion of technology from the advanced to the
lagging countries, so important in the process of catching up, works
best when the laggard shares the same ecological zone as the leader
(e.g. Japan vis-à-vis Korea and coastal China) and works most poorly
when the laggard is geographically isolated and in a distinct ecological
zone (e.g. the tropical lowlands of sub-Saharan Africa or the tropical
highlands of the Andean countries). This is a point I've often stressed,
andj find more and more evidence that this is particularly true in agri-
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culture and health, but also in construction and building materials, en-
ergy sources and uses, infrastructure design, and other areas. There is
tremendous ecological specificity to technological needs, and this speci-
ficity slows the diffusion of technologies across an ecological divide.
What are the implications of these three characteristics of the innova-
tion process: scale dependence, public goods aspects of innovation, and
ecological specificity? Taken together, I think these factors all help to
account for the widening gaps between the rich temperate-zone econo-
mies and the impoverished countries in the tropics. These factors also
help to explain why some developing countries, such as temperate or
subtropical Brazil, China, and India, are achieving some measure of
technological advance, while other smaller and geographically dis-
tressed countries are not.
V. Industrial Policies for Narrowing the Technology Gap
Without any attempt at being comprehensive in these brief overview
remarks, let me mention some policy implications. A major issue facing
all low-income countries is how to promote technological upgrading,
whether by the diffusion of technologies from abroad, or by the irinova-
tion of technologies at home. How does a country go from being tech-
nologically excluded to being an effective diffuser of technologies from
abroad? How does a country go from being a user and diffuser of tech-
nologies to being an innovator in its own right?
The most effective strategy for that purpose has been the integration
of the national economy into world production. Countries that have
been able to attract foreign direct investment in export-led sectors have
been most successful in achieving rapid technological upgrading. Poor
countries that establish themselves as bases of operation for world-
class technology leaders have enjoyed a rapid upgrading of technologi-
cal potential. Notable cases include Malaysia, Costa Rica, Israel, and
coastal China, all of which have been successful in encouraging leading
multinational firms in electronics and information technology to estab-
lish a base of operations in their national economies. These firms use
these bases of operations not mainly to serve the small domestic mar-
ket, but as low-cost manufacturing sites for worldwide production and
distribution of products.
A typical profile for an excluded country would find 70% of the econ-
omy in the rural sector. The exports would be 95% natural-resource-
based, heavily in agriculture and mining. Ten to fifteen percent of the
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population would live in urban areas, which tend to be administrative
capitals, not economic centers, and certainly not export centers. At best,
these cities supply financial and port services to the rural area, with
little urban-based manufacturing for world markets. At least a billion
people live in countries with such a profile.
So how would such a country become an active participant in global
manufactures? Basically, it would aim to make its urban areas, espe-
cially its coastal urban areas, work as bases for globalized production.
Almost all of the success stories of hooking into high technology have
occurred through humble maquiladora-type beginnings, whether in
Mexico or in export processing zones in coastal port cities around the
world. That has almost always been the first step in moving beyond
the natural resource base. One of the main problems with this path of
progress is that it may be disappearing, as a result of innovation itself.
There is a tremendous difference between 25 years ago and now in the
proportions of people who potentially can be employed in maquila-
dora-type operations, because the low-skilled jobs in export zones
(such as attaching electronics components to motherboards, or cutting
and stitching fabrics) are being replaced by advanced machinery.
Let me also mention the next step, moving from diffusion to inriova-
tion. By my count, only a few developing countries have emerged in
the past generation as innovators in their own right. We have Israel,
a country that benefited from deep intellectual, financial, and familial
connections with the high-tech countries. We have Korea and Taiwan,
which are important cases of having gone from almost no innovation
30 years ago to quite significant rates of innovation today. Adam Jaffe's
study on technological diffusion into Korea and Taiwan is the most
important recent study of how those economies learned from the tech-
nological leaders. We have additional cases in Ireland, Singapore,
Hong Kong, and (increasingly) coastal China.
The emergence of countries as innovators has typically required a
period of intensive knowledge transfer through the importation of cap-
ital goods from the leaders, and through the processes of FDI, joint
ventures, strategic alliances, and original equipment manufacturing
(OEM) relationships. In addition, and somewhat more controversially,
I believe that the emergence as an innovator has also required a strate-
gic industrial policy aimed at achieving high levels of technological
excellence and innovation capacity.
This kind of self-conscious drive towards scientific and technological
capacity began in Israel at least 75 years ago, even before the state
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emerged, as universities were established during the period of British
mandatory rule in Palestine. In the early 1970s, Taiwan and Korea be-
came interested in science and technology as a core part of develop-
ment strategy. In a rather self-conscious way, policymakers decided
"We're going to need to move beyond garments, and get into electron-
ics and other leading sectors." It was a 30-year national effort to do
that, with heavy investments of government funds and political capital.
Those investments now seem to be paying off with a high social and
economic return, as Korea and Taiwan now benefit from their techno-
logical excellence.
Thus, there are very few countries that were low innovators a gener-
ation ago and are high innovators now, but a few did make it. The
main point I would make is that markets played an important role,
but so too did conscious industrial policy. In my view, promotion of
a knowledge economy or innovation-based economy is not only a mar-
ket phenomenon, but also a process of industrial policy and govern-
ment investments in science, technology, and higher education.
VI. Science and Technology and the Excluded Poor
Finally, I'd like to take up the question of how the international com-
munity can best support the science and technology needs of the ex-
cluded poorest of the poor. What can be done about the countries
trapped by extreme poverty, geographical isolation, and ecological dis-
tress? There are four points that I want to mention briefly.
First, under any conditions, the poorest of the poor need much
greater financial assistance from donors, in the form of grants, in order
to meet the basic needs of health and education, and thereby to break
the vicious circle of poverty, disease, illiteracy, environmental degrada-
tion, and more poverty. The Report of the WHO Commission on Mac-
roeconomics and Health, which I chaired, stated that the rich countries
should be contributing about 0.1% of GNP, or $27 billion per year (as
of 2007) to meet the urgent disease control needs of the world's poorest
countries. Additional sums will be needed to meet basic needs in edu-
cation, water and sanitation, energy, and environmental infrastructure.
Second, and more specifically in the science and technology realm,
the international donors could support much greater efforts on the
scientific issues facing developing countries in health, environment,
agriculture, energy, and other areas, particularly those in which the
poorest of the poor face distinctive ecological challenges. The WHO
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Commission found that the "diseases of the poor," those conditions
that hit the poor countries with a highly disproportionate burden be-
cause of ecology (e.g. malaria) or living conditions (e.g. tuberculosis),
tend to be dramatically underfunded in biomedical research and devel-
opment. The Commission recommended a donor-supported effort of
around $3 billion per year to address these research and development
needs. In addition, new financial mechanismssuch a precommitment
by donors to buy new technologies such as vaccines against AIDS, ma-
lana, and TBcould be used to add powerful private-market incen-
tives to the direct donor support.
In addition to health, there are dramatically low levels of funding
in many other critical areas of science. The Consultative Group on In-
ternational Agricultural Research(CGIAR), for example, which is the
world's preeminent network of public-sector research institutes in
tropical agriculture, is currently supported at the level of $350 million
a year for all the institutes combined. This sum is less than half of
Monsanto's recent R&D budget in recent years. So a single (albeit lead-
ing) company has an R&D budget more than twice that of the whole
global tropical agricultural research network.
Third, there is an opportunity to rethink the intellectual property
rights (IPR) regime of the world trading system vis-à-vis the world's
poorest countries. In the Uruguay Round negotiation, the international
pharmaceutical industry pushed very hard for universal patent protec-
tion without considering the implications for the poorest countries.
There is little doubt that the new IPR arrangements can make it more
difficult for consumers in the poorest countries to access key technolo-
gies, as we've seen vividly in the case of essential medicines. The coun-
tries negotiating the new Doha round are already committed to
reexamining the IPR issue in light of public health priorities, and they
are wise to do so. It also may well be the case that the tightening of
IPRs may slow the diffusion of technology to the world's poorest coun-
tries that has traditionally come through copying and reverse engi-
neering. Those hallowed pathways of technological diffusion are
increasingly being slowed, and the effects on the poorest countries may
be severe. This is an area for close observation, policy attention, and
continuing research.
Fourth, we need to examine new and more dynamic approaches to
technology transfer from rich to poor countries. It is amazing how
many international treaties and declarations have identified technol-
ogy transfer to be a goal of the international system. Yet there is very
The Global Innovation Divide 141
little operational follow-through. What kind of programs can foster
technology transfer? How can they best be monitored? It's considered
a life-and-death issue by at least some poor countries, and a matter of
neglect by the rich countries. The poor countries are asking whether
rich countries could start taking seriously some of the long-standing
international commitments in this area, but so far they have not heard
any response.
